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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CONTINENTAL BUS SYSTE~r, 
INC., a Corporation; DENVER.:; 
SAI1T LAKE-PACIFIC STAGES, 
INC., a Corporation; GARRETT 
FREIGHT LINES, INC., a Corpo-
ration: 1\tliLNE TRUCK LINES, 
INC., a Corporation; PALMER 
BROTHERS, INCORPORATED, a 
Coporation, and RIO GRANDE 
\t<)T()RWAY, INC., a Corporation. 
Plaintiffs, 
_,·s.-
PUBT.JIC SERVICE COMiliiSSION 
OF UTAH and HAL S. BENNETT, 
DOXALD HACKING a.nd RAY-
MOND W. GEE, Commissioners of 
the Public Service Commission of 
Utah, and WYCOFF C01\IP ANY, 
INCOR.PORATED, a Corporation, 
Defendants. 
Ca.se 
No.10107 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS, 
PlTBI.jiC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
~\ND ITS COMMISSIONERS 
ST'"\TE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Public Serv-
ice Commission of Utah dismissing the complaint of 
plaintiffs and the order to show cause issued thereon. 
Such complaint prayed for an order vacating bi-monthly 
l 
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temporary permits which had been issued by the Com-
mission to Wycoff Company, Incorporated, and deter-
mining that thesame should not be issued in the future 
since the Commission has no jurisdiction to issue tem-
porary authority to common, as distinguished from con-
tract carriers. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BEFORE THE 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
The complaint of Continental Bus System, Inc., and 
Denver-Salt Lake-Pacific Stages, Inc., prayed for an 
order vacating the temporary permit issued to Wycoff 
Company, Incorporated, hereinafter called Wycoff, au-
thorizing it to transport contractors' and machinery 
dealers' repair parts, supplies and equipment between 
all points and places in the State of Utah. Upon hear-
ing, in which other common carriers joined as inter-
venors and complainants, the Public Service Commission 
dismissed the complaint and declared its order to show 
cause satisfied. This appeal relates to such order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek to sustain the order of the Public 
Service Commission dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and 
vacating the Commission's order to show cause. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants agree with plaintiffs' statement of facts. 
However, with respect to the paragraph on page 6 of 
2 
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plaintiffs' brief, the court's attention is directed to the 
lt\ngthy discussion on pages 9 through 17 of the record 
concemin~ the Commission's practice with respect to the 
filing with the Commission of a copy of the contract be-
tw(lcn <'-nrrier and shipper. It appears from this dis-
cussion that the Commission usually requires the filing 
of n copy of the contract when it issues permanent con-
tract authority, but that when a temporary permit is 
issued the filing of a copy of the contract is not always 
n\quired hy the Commission. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
ASSUMING THAT THE AUTHORITY 
GRANTED WYCOFF IS COMMON CARRIER 
AUTHORITY, THE PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION ACTED WITHIN ITS JURISDIC-
TION IN ISSUING TEMPORARY PERl\IIITS 
TO WYCOFF. 
Under Point I of plaintiffs' brief, most of plaintiffs' 
argument is directed toward showing that defendant 
\V"ycoff Company, Incorporated, is a common carrier as 
tli~tinguished from a contract carrier; that the tempo-
rary permits issued by the Public Service Commission to 
'Vycoff are in reality temporary grants of common car-
rier authority; and that the Public Service Commission 
exceeded its jurisdiction in granting temporary common 
earrier authority, since Section 54-6-10, U.C.A. 1953, pro-
ndes that temporary permits may be granted to contract 
carriers and there is no statute specifically authorizing 
the granting of temporary permits to common carriers. 
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Assuming that the authority granted Wycoff under 
the temporary permits is common carrier authority, it is 
defendants' contention that the Public Service Commis-
sion ha.s the power to issue temporary authority to Wy-
coff by virtue of the provisions of the Public Utilities 
Act, namely Section 54-4-1, U.C.A. 1953, which reads as 
follows: 
''The commission is hereby vested 'vith power 
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every 
public utility in this state, and to supervise all of 
the business of every such public utility in this 
state, and to do a.ll things, whether herein speci-
fically designated or in addition thereto, which 
are necessary or convenient in the exercise of 
such power and jurisdiction. '' 
Prior to the year 1927, common carriers were regu-
later under the Public Utilities Act. Subsection 14 of 
Section 4782, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, defines a 
common carrier as follows: 
"The term 'common carrier,' when used in this 
title, includes every railroad corporation; street 
railroad corporation; automobile corporation; ex-
press corporation; dispatch, sleeping car, dining 
car, drawing room car, fright, freight line, refrig-
erator, oil, stock, fruit, car loaning, car renting, 
carloading and every other car corporation or per-
son, their lessees, trsutees, receivers, or trustees 
appointed by any court whatsoever, operating for 
public service within this state; and every corpo-
ration or person, their lessees, trustees, receivers, 
or trustees appointed by any court whatsoever en-
gaged in the transportation of persons or property 
for public service, over regular routes between 
points within this state." (emphasis added) 
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Subsection 28 of said Section defines a public utility as 
fo11ows: 
''The term 'public utility,' ""hen used in this 
title, includes every common carrier, gas corpora-
tion, automobile corporation, electric corpora-
tion, teleg-raph corporation, water corporation, 
heat corporation, and warehouseman where the 
service is performed for or the commodity deliv-
ered to the public or any portion thereof. The 
term 'public or any portion thereof,' as herein 
used means the public generally, or any limited 
portion of the public including a person, private 
corporation, municipality, or other political sub-
division of the state, to which the service is per-
formed or to which the commodity is delivered, 
• • •." (emphasis added) 
It is to be noted that while common motor carriers 
\vere subject to the Public Utilities Act, private or con-
trn<lt carriers "·ere not, as they do not transport persons 
or property for ''public service.'' 
In the case of State v. Nelson (1925) 238 Pac. 237, 
239, this court said : 
'' • • • The principles of law announced in the 
cited cases are readily admitted. However, we 
think they are not applicable to the case in hand. 
They do not on similar facts and circumstances 
shO\\' that one situated or conditioned as "~as the 
defendant is a common carrier. They all recog-
nize that a common or public carrier is one \vho, 
by virtue of his business or calling or holding out, 
undertakes for compensation to transport persons 
or property, or both, from one place to another for 
all such as may choose to employ him. Running 
through the cases is a recognition of the dominant 
element of public service, serving and carrying 
5 
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all persons indifferently who apply for passage 
or for shipment of goods or freight. To constitute 
a common carrier such element is also requisite 
under the Utilities Act. It defines a 'common car-
rier,' as the term is used therein, to include among 
others every automobile corporation engaged in 
the transportation of persons or property for pub-
lic service over regular routes between points 
within the state and an automobile rorporation 
to include every corporation or person engaged 
in or transacting business of transporting pas-
sengers or freight, merchandise, or other prop-
erty, for compensation by means of automobiles 
or automobile stages on public streets, roads, or 
highways along established routes within the 
state. Public service, as distinguished from mere 
private service, is thus a necessary factor to con-
stitute a common carrier. Such element, in por-
tions of the act, is not as clearly expressed as 
might be. Nevertheless, it necessarily is implied. 
It is only by the presence of such factor or ele-
ment that the commission has power or authority 
to regulate or control such business. Eliminating 
it, its power and jurisdiction are gone. * * * So, 
if the business or concern is not public serYice, 
where the public has not a legal right to the use 
of it, where the business or operation is not open 
to an indefinite public , it is not subject to the 
jurisdiction or regulation of the commission. * * f; '' 
See also Denver arnd Rio Grande Railw·ay v. Li'Mk 
(Utah), 56 F. 2d 957. 
In 1927 the Legislature gave the Public Utilities 
Commission authority to regulate "That are no'v called 
contract motor carriers by enacting Chapter 42, La,vs of 
Utah 1927, which provided that all "automobile com-
panies for hire must obtain a permit from the Public 
6 
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{;tilitiP~ Commission." This apparently included both 
rommon and contract carriers. The section of this Act 
pPrtaining to vermits "·as amended in 1929 by Chapter 
9-l, Laws of lftah 1929, by the addition of the following 
phrase: 
"• • • This Act shall not apply to an auto-
mobile corporation, public utility or common car-
rier, as defined in Section 4 782, Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1917, holding a certificate of convenience and 
necessity issued by the Public Utilities Commis-
sion of thr State of Utah, when such automobile 
corporation, public utliity or common carrier is 
operating between the points de signa ted in said 
ePrtificate. '' 
In 1933 the Legislature enacted a Motor Transport 
:\.ct (Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1933), which contained 
provisions quite similar to present law. In 1935 the 1933 
.Art \vas repealed and the law pertaining to motor ve-
hicle transportation in substantially the same form as it 
is today "·as enacted by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 1935, 
including for the first time a provision for temporary 
permits for contract carriers (Section 54-6-10, U.C.A. 
1953) and the following provision, Section 54-6-2, U.C.A. 
19-q 'lt) : 
' ' .AJl common motor carriers of property or 
passengers as defined in this act are hereby de-
rlared to be common carriers within the meaning 
of the public. utility laws of this state, and sub-
ject to this act and to the la".,.s of this state, in-
rluding the regulation of all rates and charges now 
in force or that hereafter may be enacted, per-
taining to public utilities and common carriers as 
far as applicable, and not in conflict herewith.'' 
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The reason for reciting the foregoing legislative his-
tory of the ~iotor Carrier Act is to point out that 
since the beginning of motor vehicle transporta-
tion common carriers have been regulated as public 
utilities. The laws adopted subsequent to 1927 brought 
contract motor carriers under the regulation of what is 
now the Public Service Commission, and added additional 
provisions for the regulation of common motor carriers. 
With respect to common motor carriers, the present I\io-
tor Carrier Act is merely supplemental to the Public 
Utilities Act. Common motor carriers are subject to 
both Acts, while contract carriers are subject to the one. 
It was necessary, therefore, for the Legislature to make 
provision for the granting of temporary permits to con-
tract carriers, as the Public Service Commission already 
had such authority with respect to common carriers under 
the Public Utilities Act, namely, Section 54-4-1, U.C.A. 
1953. 
Not only does Section 54-6-2, U.C.A. 1953, specifically 
declare common motor carriers to be subject to the 
Public Utilities act, but it is a well recognized principle 
of statutory construction that statutes in pari materia are 
to be construed so that effect is given to each. Accord-
ing to 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 530: 
'' • • • On the presumption that whenever the 
Legislature enacts a provision it has in mind the 
previous statutes relating to the same subject 
matter, it is held that in the absence of any express 
repeal or amendment therein, the ne'v provision 
was enacted in accord with the legislative policy 
embodied in those prior statutes, and they all 
should be constructed together. Provisions in an 
8 
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H<'t \vhich are omitted in another act relating to 
the same sbject matter will be applied in a pro-
Cf'Pding undrr the other a.ct, 'vhen not inconsis-
tPnt with its purposes. Prior statutes relating 
to the snme subject matter are to be compared 
\\·ith the ne\\' provision; and if possible by reason-
able construction, both are to be so construted that 
effect iH given to every provision of each. • • • '' 
The plaintiffs argue that if Section 54-4-1, U .C.A. 
1953, which is set forth in full on page 4 of this brief, 
c.ould grant so fundamental a power as the right to issue 
n type of operating authority, it would be an unlawful 
delegation of power, as there is not the slightest standard 
or criteria set forth in the statute pursuant to which the 
po,ver is to be exercised. The validity of the section is 
not before the court, and as 'vas said by this court in 
Nort,ille ''· State Ta.r Commission, 97 P. 2d 937, 939: 
"Statutes duly enacted by the legislature are 
presumed to be constitutional and valid. • * * 
''The duty of this court in construing and in-
terpreting legislative acts is to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature. • • • 
'' .A.s stated in Sutherland on Statutory Con-
struction, Sec.. 241, at p. 320: 'In the exposition of 
a statute the intention of the law-maker will pre-
vail ov-er the literal sense of the terms; and its 
reason and intention will prevail over the strict 
letter. When the words are not explicit the in-
tention is to be collected from the context; from 
the occasion and necessity of the law; from the 
mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and the in-
tention is to be taken or presumed according to 
what is consonant with reason and good dis-
cretion. ' '' 
9 
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Furthermore, this court said in State v. Salt Lake 
City Public Board of Education, 13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P. 
2d 468, 469: 
''If there be any uncertainty as to the mean-
ing and the proper application of the statute, 
either from its language or its failure to make ex-
press provision for circumstances in which it may 
be found to operate, it is proper to look both to 
the purpose for which it was created, and to the 
practical aspects of its operation in order to 
assist in determining the legislative intent.'' 
Also see State v. Melton, et ux., (Wash. 1952), 248 P. 
2d 892. 
Section 54-4-1, U.C.A. 1953, was enacted in 1917 
and Section 54-6-10, U.C.A. 1953, in 1935. The language 
of Section 54-4-1 indicates that the Legislature must have 
anticipated that the Public Service Commission would 
be faced with some emergencies and unforeseen circum-
stances wherein it would be necessary for the Commis-
sion to issue temporary permits or perform other acts 
requiring the exercise of reasonable discretion, as the 
section reads, in part : 
' ' * * * and to do all things, whether herein 
specifically designated or in addition thereto, 
'vhich are necessary or concenient in the exercise 
of such power and jurisdiction.'' (Emphasis 
added.) 
Throughout the years the Commission has found it 
necessary to issue temporary permits to protect the pub-
10 
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lie intPrest in unusual situations. T n its Findings of Fact, 
thP Commission said (R-104): 
4
' The f>u blic Servce Commission is charged 
with the duty of seeing to it that the public re-
ceives efficient and economic transportation serv-
ice. This is also true respecting other types of 
utility service, electric, communication, water, 
steam, etc. Constantly there arises situations 
\vhere some form of temporary authority must in 
the public interest be issued to meet the needs and 
the requirements of the public. During "rar time as 
an illustration, Defense Transportation Adminis-
tration suddenly embargoed the use of railroad 
tank cars for the transportation of bulk petroleum 
products in the western area; this situation re-
sulting from the discontinuance of water petro-
leum carriers plying between the gulf area and the 
.A.tla.ntic seaboard. The need for transportation 
suddenly was aeute in Utah and the Utah Commis-
sion "ras active in soliciting carriers and equip-
ment to perform highway transportation of pe-
troleum and petroleum products, in bulk, and the 
Commission issued 'vhat it denominated war dura-
tion authority on a temporary war emergency 
basis, to meet the requirements. This authority 
was not denominated certificate of convenience 
and necesesity or contract carrier permit. 
"It clearly appears necessary at times to issue 
a form of temporary authority in order to ascer-
tain the financial feasibility of a needed public 
serYice. This situation has arisen, for instance, 
in the case of mass transportati'On service in the 
cities of Provo and in Ogden. No carrier in these 
eases is "Tilling to accept the obligation and burden 
of performing the needed public service without 
first operating on a trial basis the proposed 
service. 
11 
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''The Federal Government sold the Clearfield 
Naval Supply Depot property to private interests. 
The property contained various warehouses and 
the area is now designated the Freeport Distri-
bution Center. The necessity of continuing under 
private operation certain utility services urgently 
needed such as railroad, telephone, electric and 
steam plant plant and heating services required 
the immediate issuance of utility authority, par-
ticularly in respect to the steam plant operation. 
The Commission issued a form of temporary au-
thority to meet the situation.'' 
With respect to defendant Wycoff, the Commission 
said: 
''Processing and hearing of these various rna t-
ters has been complicated, if in fact not made im-
possible, by reason of the various other proceed-
ings involving Wycoff Company, Incorporated, 
such as the testing by Wycoff of the constitutional-
ity of the Motor Carrier Act, the litigation respect-
ing violation of Commission Orders, and the 
assessment of penalties by the Commission and 
others.'' (R-99) 
''One of the plaguing things from the Com-
mission's viewpoint and the public interest in this 
matter is to provide the expedited service sought 
by shippers without destroying the very thing that 
make the service valuable, for instance : Should 
the gro"\vth in the volume of business be such that 
the drops clearly increase and should these drops 
be made from a loaded truck, the schedules would 
be slow and cumbersome; that would not be suit-
able for the delivery of newspapers and the serv-
ice would undoubtedly become the usual truck 
service whereby the shipments are accumulated 
12 
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nnd loade•d on an over-the-road truck for break-
ing bulk at certain terminal areas and delivery 
by other vehicles. This is the typical truck opera-
tion and is pretty generally adequately furnished 
hy true king companies serving the State of Utah.'' 
(R-100) 
• 'In the meantime, machinery companies, Asso-
ciated General Contractors, and pipe line con-
tractors have urgently insisted on the need for 
the expedited, high velocity services of Wycoff 
Company, Incorporated, on emergency shipments 
of machinery repair parts, supplies and equip-
ment. The service as rendered by Wycoff Co~&­
pany, Incorporated, as to speed and convenience 
is not fully available from any other public car-
rier. This matter, of course, must be determined, 
brought to a conclusion by formal hearings and 
any decision here should not be treated as grant-
ing or denying any permanent authority, nor as a 
determination that there will be any reissuing of 
temporary authority to Wycoff Company, In-
corporated, or anybody else." (R-106) 
Thus, it ran be seen that it has been the practice of 
the Commission through the years to issue temporary 
authority to common carriers and other public utilities. 
It is also apparent that the temporary authority issued 
to Wycoff 'vas not based on an arbitrary or capracious 
art of the Commission, but rather on circumstances 'vhich 
made it neresesary if the public good "'"as to be served. 
Certainly. the Commission oYer a long period of time 
has giYen a practical interpretation to Section 54-4-1, 
U.C .... -\. 1953, and the Commission's interpretation is en-
titled to considerable weight in a consideration of the 
13 
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statute which, admittedly, is not entirely clear. In 50 
Am. Jur., Statutes, p. 309, it is stated: 
"* * * The practical construction given a stat-
ute for a long period of time has been considered 
strong evidence of the meaning of the la\Y. Such 
contemporaneous or practical construction is 
treated by the courts as of importance, and as 
entitled to great weight, respect, and persuasiY<-) 
influence. * * *" 
This court has recognized the doctrine of contempo-
raneous construction. Alexander v. Bennett, 5 U. 2d 163, 
298 P. 2d 823 ;Murdock v. J.l!abey, 59 Utah 346, 203 Pac. 
651. The fact that the Commission designated Wycoff's 
temporary authority as a ''temporary permit'' instead of 
a "temporary certificate of convenience and necessity" 
should be of no great consequence. For a period of time 
the Utah la'v designated the authority as a "permit" and 
the Commission has merely carried on that nomenclature. 
Section 76-5-2, Revised Statutes of 1933, provided: 
''No motor transport corporation shall estab-
lish or begin operation of a line or route outside of 
cities or towns or any extension of any line or 
route outside of cities Or towns writhout first haY-
ing obtained from the Public Utilities Commis-
sion a permit therefor. * * * '' 
Also, the fact that the Commission referred to Sec-
tion 54-6-10, U.C.A. 1953, as authority for issuing tem-
porary permits should not be given undue \Yeight, as in 
its Findings of Fact the Commission also referred to Sec-
tion 54-4-1, U.C.A. 1933, saying (R. 106): 
'' * * * This section, of course, i~ so broad as to 
become some"\\'"hat meaningless, but in any event 
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it must empower the ( iommis~ion to exercise its 
discretion in rPspect to the issuance of forms of 
temporary authority in transportation and other 
utility services even though it be done without 
formal hearing, and we are certain that the Com-
mission is legally and properly pursuing its au-
thority 'vhich "~e have discussed above. 
''It may be that the legislature should more 
clearly and definitely define and specify such au-
thority. We would have no objection to this. 
''An issue has been made in this case with re-
speet to the reissuing of the temporary authority 
here under consideration to Wycoff Company, In-
corpora ted, every 60 days 'vithout a hearing. This 
may appear on its face as arbitrary and capricious 
action on the part of the Commission. However, 
as set forth above, this particular rna tter has been 
before the Commission almost constantly for a. 
long period of time and has got involved "~i th 
other matters to the point where a full hearing 
has been difficult to carry forward." (R-106) 
In conclusion, if 've assume that the temporary au-
thority granted \\Tyroff is a common motor carrier au-
thority, it is the position of defendants that the Com-
mission had implied power to issue the temporary au-
thority under Section 54-4-1 of the Public Utilities Act. 
POINT II. 
IX THE .A.LTERNATIVE, .._\SSU1IIXG THAT 
THE .._\.UTHORITY GRANTED WYCOFF IS 
C.1XTR.A.CT C .. ARRIER AUTHORITY, THE 
I)UBLIC SJ1~R\TICE COM~IISSION ACTED 
\\~THIX ITS JURISDICTION IN ISSUING 
TE~IPOR .. A.RY PER~IITS TO WYCOFF. 
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In the alternative, it is defendants' position that, if 
the Public Service Commission did not have implied 
power to issue temporary permits to Wycoff as a com-
mon motor carrier, it did have authority to issue the 
pen:pits as a contract motor carrier under the provisions 
of Section 54-6-10, U.C.A. 1953, which section specifically 
provides that a temporary permit may be issued to con-
tract motor carriers. 
There is nothing in the Utah law prohibiting a car-
rier from holding both a common carrier certificate and 
a contract carrier permit. It does appear, however, from 
cases in which this question has arisen, that while a 
carrier may engage in both common and contract car-
riage, it may not do so when offering the same service 
it gives as a common carrier. This general rule is stated 
in 13 Am. J ur. 2d, Carriers, p. 644, as follows: 
''The regulatory statutes in many states, pro-
viding for certificates of convenience and neces-
sity for common carriers by motor vehicle and per-
mits for contract carriers by motor vehicle, 
prohibit the same carrier from operating both as 
a common carrier and as a contract carrier, al-
though it has been held that such a statute does not 
prohibit a carrier from engaging in both common 
and contract carriage, so long as the same goods 
are not carried bet,veen the same points in both 
capacities. ' ' 
See Alves v. Public Service Commission of Califor-
n,ia, 260 P. 2d 785; Brothers v. State Industrial Commis-
sion, (Oreg.) 12 P. 2d 302. 
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'rhe distinction bet,veen common and contract motor 
('nrrierR is not ahva.ys clear and precise. 1\c.tually, a con-
tract is involved every time goods are shipped by either 
type ot' carrier. The primary distinction appears to be 
that the common carrier holds itself out as a carrier to 
anyoJH' who desires its services, whereas the contract 
cnrriPr may be selective in those with 'vhom it deals and 
refuse service to the general public. 
rrhe difficulty encountered in determining whether a 
c.arrier is a common or eontract carrier is illustrated by 
the ('ase of .. lfcCarthy v. Public Service Commission, 111 
Utah 489, 184 P. 2d 220, in 'vhich this court had to make 
surh a determination. In that case, the defendants were 
haulers of sand, gravel, loose earth, and cement in bulk, 
w·ho had been issued certificates of convenience and ne-
t'l\ssity as eommon carriers. The plaintiff challenged the 
Commission's Order, claiming that defendants "~ere con-
tract carriers. The evidence disclosed that, while in gen-
eral the defendants negotiated their contracts 'vith in-
tlividual contractors or customers, at least some of them 
offered their services to anyone desiring it. Defendant 
Rowley testified as follo,vs: 
''Q. Why do you ask for a certificate of con-
venience and necessity¥ Doesn't a contract car-
rier's permit fit your situation~ 
H .J.~. No, because I might work for seven dif-
ferent contractors in the space of a half a day. In 
other words, I am holding myself forth as a public 
trucker. I will have any one of the trucks on seven 
different jobs working for seven different people 
in the space of one day.'' 
17 
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In holding that defendants were contract motor car-
riers, ~Ir. Justice Wolfe in a concurring opinion, \vhich 
was also concurred in by Chief Justice ~icDonough, sn id : 
''These applicants are contract motor carriers. 
The public needs their services as contract motor 
carriers. I see no reason why general contract 
carrier permits could not be issued after the re-
quired notice and hearing, which general permits 
would allow these carriers to haul sarid and gravel 
and cement anywhere in the state (or in specific 
areas, depending on the showing made.) * * * '' 
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Wade said: 
'' * * * The showing here was to the effect that 
they had been serving the public generally, that 
wherever there was work to be done of their type 
they proceeded to do it, and that their services 
were not con:fiined to a few individuals. * * * '' 
The difficulty in distinguishing contract from com-
mon carriers is further illustrated in the case of Realty 
Purcha.sing Comp·any v. Public Service Commission, 9 
U. 2d. 375, 345 P. 2d 606. In that case the defendant Salt 
Lake Transportation Company contracted with four air-
lines for the transportation of passengers to and from 
the Salt Lake airport. Defendant's compensation came 
from charging each passenger $1.00, and the only con-
trol granted the airlines \Yas the right to require minimum 
standards of service and insurance coYerage. In su:-;-
taining the Commission's Order granting the defendant 
a. contract carrier permit, Chief Justice Crockett said: 
'' * * * The question as to the character of the op-
eration and its classification is primarily for the 
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( iommission with its expertise in this field. It has 
the responsi hili ty to the public of supervising and 
rPh"Ulating carrier services in general. It found 
that the defendant met the requirements and au-
thorized it to perform the service which it deemed 
a proper one in the over-all transportation pic-
ture. It does not seem too important by what 
tith"' it is called." 
Again, the court's opinion was not unanimous, Dis-
trict ,Judge Hoyt entering his dissent with an opinion 
thn t defendant was a common carrier. 
\Vycoff's certificate of convenience and necessity No. 
1162-Sub. 2, authorizes Wycoff to transport general com-
modities of 100 pounds or less in weight in express serv-
ice between all points and places in the State of Utah, 
subject to the restriction that Wycoff shall not transport 
surh commodities in excess of 500 pounds on a weight 
ha~is of such express items on any one schedule. It is to 
be noted that the temporary permit issued to Wycoff 
does not permit the transportation of general commodi-
ties, but is limited to ''contractors and machinery deal-
ers repair parts, supplies and equipment in emergency 
~hipments to repair or job locations which may oceasion-
ally exceed 100 pounds per shipment limits and/ or total 
Pxpress " .. hich by reason of said emergency shipment may 
occasionally exceed 500 pounds of express on one au-
thorized schedule.'' (R. 103 and permits in exhibit.) 
From these restrictions in Wycoff's temporary per-
mit, it ran be seen that the goods Wycoff can transport is 
limited to a particular type; that they can be transported 
only in emergencies and 'vhen Wyeoff's load occasionally 
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exceeds the 100 and 500 pounds limits; and that they can 
be transported only to repair or job locations. It is eYi-
dent ,therefore, that Wycoff's services under the tempo-
rary permit are performed for only an extremely limited 
segment of the public, and that they are more in the na-
ture of a contract carrier's authority than a common car-
rier's. Also, even though Wycoff may carry the same 
type of goods under its permanent common carrier cer-
tificate, there is such a definite distinction between the 
service it is permitted to perform under its temporary 
permit and those it may perform as a common carrier, 
that there is no real conflict between the t"To authorities 
granted. 
POINT III. 
THE C01\1MISSION DID NOT ACT ABITRAR-
ILY NOR CAPRICIOUSLY IN ISSUING 
TEMPORARY PERMITS IN CONSECUTIVE 
ORDER OVER A PERIOD OF APPROXI-
MATELY THREE YEARS. 
The Utah law is silent with respect to the issuance of 
temporary p·ermits in consecutive order. Section 54-6-10, 
U.C.A. 1953, provides that temporary, seasonal or emer-
gency permits may be issued for a period not greater than 
sixty days, and Section 54-4-1 of the Public Utilities Act 
does not specifically mention temporary permits. It is 
certainly conceivable that an emergency or the need for 
temporary authority could last for three years or longer. 
As was pointed out in the Commission's Findings of Fact 
(R ), during 'Vorld War II, temporary authority 'vas 
granted to carriers able to transport petroleum and pe-
troleum products in bulk. 
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With respect to the question before us, the Commis-
~ion stated in its Findings of Fact that in other cases 
heard hy the Commission many public ''itnesses had 
tt·~t ified ns to the need of a high-Yelocity emergency type 
service rendered on a seven-day per week basis (R. 100, 
106). Thf' (Jommission stated further that it was con-
C(.lnled about the need for such service but that if the 
number of drops made by Wycoff should increase very 
much, they \vould have to be made from loaded trucks 
with the result that the schedules \vould be slow, the expe-
dited service could not be rendered, and the service would 
be the same as the typical truck operations adequately 
furnished by other carriers (R. 100). It stands to reason 
that if this should oceur, the temporary or emergency 
authority could be quickly terminated by the Commission. 
In vie\\y of the foregoing, it is clear that the Com-
mission acted in the public's best interest and that its 
practical method of meeting the temporary need or emer-
g-ency \vas not arbitrary nor capricious. Certainly, the 
Commission is in the best position to judge the duration 
of the need for which it issued the temporary authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The Public Service Commission's action, in granting 
temporary authority to Wycoff, was in the best interest 
of the public and this court should sustain the Commis-
sion·~ order. The Commission had jurisdiction and 
power to issue such authority either as temporary com-
mon carrier authority or as temporary eontract motor 
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carrier authority. As was said by Chief Justice Crock-
ett, in Realty Purchasing Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, supra: ''The question as to the character of the 
operation and its classification is primarily for the Com-
mission with its expertise in this field. ,.. * * It does not 
seem too important by what title it is called.'' 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
H. WRIGHT VOLKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Public Service Commission 
and Its Commissioners. 
22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
